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sychiatric disorders commonly reflect affective
imbalances within the brain. Accordingly, a key question
in psychiatric research is the neural nature of emotional
feelings. For instance, in depression research, one of the
most important unanswered questions is: Why does
depression feel so bad? What is the “psychological pain”
that leads people to lose their joy of living? Exactly the
same affective issues confront us when we study addic-
tions. Here we explore the possibility that chronic affec-
tive changes may arise from functional changes in basic
emotional systems of the brain. For example, diminished
arousability of specific positive affective systems along
with elevated activation of distinct negative affective net-
works may be the fundamental source of depressive affect. 
Clinical research
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Cross-species affective neuroscience studies confirm that primary-process emotional feelings are organized within prim-
itive subcortical regions of the brain that are anatomically, neurochemically, and functionally homologous in all mam-
mals that have been studied. Emotional feelings (affects) are intrinsic values that inform animals how they are faring in
the quest to survive. The various positive affects indicate that animals are returning to “comfort zones” that support sur-
vival, and negative affects reflect “discomfort zones” that indicate that animals are in situations that may impair survival.
They are ancestral tools for living—evolutionary memories of such importance that they were coded into the genome in
rough form (as primary brain processes), which are refined by basic learning mechanisms (secondary processes) as well as
by higher-order cognitions/thoughts (tertiary processes). To understand why depression feels horrible, we must fathom
the affective infrastructure of the mammalian brain. Advances in our understanding of the nature of primary-process
emotional affects can promote the development of better preclinical models of psychiatric disorders and thereby also
allow clinicians new and useful ways to understand the foundational aspects of their clients' problems. These networks
are of clear importance for understanding psychiatric disorders and advancing psychiatric practice.      
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critical importance of brain systems that integrate the
distress and despair of separation-distress (overactiv-
ity of basic PANIC/GRIEF networks) and the dimin-
ished arousal of SEEKING networks that constitute
dysphoria will be presented. Excessive arousal of
SEEKING urges may contribute substantially to
mania and psychostimulant addictions, leading to
excessive elation/euphoria, arising from excessive
appetitive dopamine SEEKING urges, which can pro-
mote unwise life choices.
1 (Capitalizations highlight
the need for a specialized vocabulary when discussing
the evolutionary foundations of the mind. Vernacular
terms have excess meanings, and thus will not suffice
for clear discourse). Thus, drug addictions share some
important affective features with depression; for
instance, the dysphoric feelings that accompany both
addictive drug withdrawal and depression which
reflect diminished SEEKING urges.
2 Studies in psy-
chology and neuroscience, as well as in psychiatric syn-
dromes, indicate that there are many distinct emo-
tional feelings within mammalian brains and minds
(henceforth BrainMind, a monistic term). We are just
beginning to understand the underlying innate, genet-
ically determined, and epigenetically refined aspects
of emotional feelings.
Emotional nomenclature can be confusing. Here pri-
mary-process (ie, basic or primordial) emotional net-
works are defined in terms of neural and behavioral cri-
teria. Basic emotional networks can be defined by six
criteria: 
￿ They generate characteristic behavioral-instinctual
action patterns 
￿ They are initially activated by a limited set of uncon-
ditional stimuli 
￿ The resulting arousals outlast precipitating circum-
stances 
￿ Emotional arousals gate/regulate various sensory
inputs into the brain 
￿ They control learning and help program higher brain
cognitive activities
￿ With maturation, higher brain mechanisms come to
regulate emotional arousals. 
Affects are the subjectively experienced aspects of emo-
tions, commonly called feelings. Critical evidence now
indicates that primary-process emotional affects are
mammalian/human birthrights that arise directly from
genetically encoded emotional action circuits that antic-
ipate key survival needs. They mediate what philoso-
phers have called “intentions-in-action” (Table I).
Until we understand the neurobiological nature of basic
emotional feelings within the human BrainMind, our
understanding of psychiatric disorders will remain woe-
fully incomplete. Because of striking cross-species
homologies in mammalian primary-process emotional
systems, animal models may provide optimal guidance
for deciphering brain affective mechanisms that also
operate in our species. This review will delve into vari-
ous levels of emotional control, especially the first: 
￿ Primary-process emotional feelings within mammalian
brains—namely the experienced aspects of the uncon-
ditioned emotional brain systems (ie, “instinctual” inte-
grative BrainMind systems) in action. From a philo-
sophical point of view, they control
“intentions-in-action.”
￿ Secondary emotional processes that arise from simple
emotional learning, such as classical and operant con-
ditioning that has been well studied in animal models,
especially FEAR conditioning. 
￿ Tertiary-process emotions are the intrapsychic rumina-
tions and thoughts about one’s lot in life. Such higher-
order affective-cognitions that promote “intentions-to-
act” and are elaborated by medial-frontal regions,
which can only be well studied in humans (Table I). 
It is among the inherited subcortical primary-process
instinctual tools for living that the foundations of human
emotional lives reside, and neurochemical imbalances
there can lead to persistent affective imbalances of psy-
chiatric significance.
3 Also, it is reasonable to currently
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1. Primary-process, basic-primordial affects (sub-neocortical)
i) Emotional affects (emotion action systems; 
intentions-in-actions)
ii) Homeostatic affects (hunger, thirst, etc via brain-body 
interoceptors)
iii) Sensory affects (sensorially triggered pleasurable-
displeasurable feelings)
2. Secondary-process emotions (learning via basal ganglia)
i) Classical conditioning
ii) Instrumental and operant conditioning
iii) Emotional habits
3. Tertiary affects and neocortical “awareness” functions
i) Cognitive executive functions: thoughts and planning
ii) Emotional ruminations and regulations
iii) “Free-will” or intention-to-act
Table I. Levels of control in brain emotion-affective processing.
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els of organization remain critically linked to the dynam-
ics of primary processes, which serve as a foundation for
diverse higher psychological functions.
The mammalian brain is clearly an organ where evolu-
tionary layering remains evident at both the anatomical
and chemical levels, and striking cross-species homolo-
gies exist in the more ancient primary-process neural
regions.
4 In contrast, higher brain functions, which are
much harder to study in preclinical models, are more dis-
tinct across species. Such neuroevolutionary facts allow
us to envision primary emotional processes in humans
that are homologous across mammals, permitting animal
models to effectively illuminate how primordial emo-
tional feelings—ancestral states of consciousness—
emerge from human brain activities.
5 In addition,
advances in understanding subcortical emotional brain
organization, especially its evolutionary roots, can illu-
minate certain higher tertiary-process BrainMind func-
tions, permitted by massive encephalization in primates.
Here, some of the cross-species primary-process emo-
tional systems that help us decipher the foundations of
emotions in normal human mental life, as well as psy-
chiatric conditions, will be described.
6 However, first it
should be noted that there are historical forces at work
that are delaying such integration.
Many still believe in James-Lange's 125-year-old con-
jecture that emotional feelings reflect neocortical
“readout” of bodily autonomic arousals. For a sam-
pling of such opinions from prominent investigators
see the video of Charlie Rose’s 8th Brain Series on
May 26, 2010.
7 Regrettably, this time-honored theo-
retical vision has essentially no consistent support.
However, evidence that affective feelings arise directly
from medial subcortical networks is consistent and
substantial.
8 The primary-process networks for emo-
tional instincts run from midbrain periaqueductal gray
(PAG) regions to medial diencephalon to various basal
ganglia nuclei (amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria ter-
minalis, nucleus accumbens, etc) that interact with
paleocortical brain functions (eg, cingulate, insular, as
well as medial- and orbitofrontal cortices) and more
indirectly with certain neocortical regions to provide
integration with higher cognitive activities. The sub-
cortical locus of affect generation strongly suggests
that the foundational principles of human emotions
can be understood by studying these brain structures
and functions in other animals.
9
Historical perspectives and the role of
animal models in biological psychiatry
Twentieth-century thinking about psychiatric issues can
be divided into two phases: the first half of the century
focused heavily on emotional and related psychological
complexities, especially through Freud-inspired psycho-
analytic theory. Because of the immaturity of neuro-
science, this eventually led to the study of the mind with-
out a brain—a top-down speculative perspective with
little scientific basis. The second half of the century, after
the discovery of several highly effective psychiatric med-
ications, was framed more in a Krapelinian context—
psychiatric diagnostic categories were linked to diverse
brain mechanisms, which were studied objectively. This
has now led to abundant ruthless reductionism, where
mental (experienced) aspects of brain functions are
inadequately considered in the genesis of psychiatric dis-
orders, especially when preclinical models are used to
clarify underlying principles. This has led to the increas-
ing study of living brains without feelings—without a
mind. This is ontologically unsatisfactory.
The above traditions can now be blended, illuminating
how our ancestral affective BrainMind contributes to
and often causes psychiatric problems. But the absence
of a general solution to how emotional feelings are cre-
ated in the brain continues to impede development of
neuroscientifically coherent psychiatric nosologies
(reflected in the current discussions regarding DSM-5
definitions). Detailed understanding of primary emo-
tional systems in animal models may yield psychologi-
cally relevant endophenotypes for psychiatry.
10
However, preclinical models pose major problems, as
emphasized by the past director of NIMH, Steve
Hyman,
11who highlighted three dilemmas of current
research in facilitating more coherent future nosologies
(eg, DSM-5). They were (my commentary in italics):
￿ “The difficulty of characterizing the circuitry and
mechanisms that underlie higher brain functions.”
Regrettably Hyman largely neglected the emotional dif-
ficulties that arise from imbalanced lower emotional-
affective brain functions that can be studied in animals.
￿ The “complexity of the genetic and developmental
underpinnings of normal and abnormal behavioral
variation” that prevents integration between diagnos-
tic labels and brain pathophysiology. This is surely so,
but many current emotion-free genetic-psychiatric link-
age studies are providing few insights. Perhaps more the-
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lead to faster progress.
12
￿ The “unsatisfactory nature of current animal models
of mental disorders.” The key problem here may be our
relative unwillingness to discuss the nature of affective
experience in animals, which prevents development of
preclinical brain emotional-network models that could
better clarify primary-affective issues. 
The rest of this article will highlight: (i) how emotional
states can be understood neuroscientifically through ani-
mal models; and (ii) how such knowledge can impact
clinical practice in biological psychiatry, with a focus on
depression.
Emotion theory—old beliefs and new realities
Primary-process emotion approaches to the BrainMind
are not well represented in modern psychology, psychi-
atry, or even neuroscience. The most widely acknowl-
edged theory of emotional feelings remains the James-
Lange conjecture (see above) that advanced the
counterintuitive idea of life-challenging situations (ie,
when inadvertently confronted by a grizzly bear in the
woods) resulting first in various bodily symptoms of
autonomic arousal, and emotional experiences follow-
ing only after bodily arousals are “read out” by higher
cognitive processes. This has promoted the misleading
belief that emotions are just a subset of cognitive
process. If one defines cognitive processes as neural han-
dling of incoming sensory stimuli, a disciplined distinc-
tion can be made between cognitive and primary-
process emotional processes, with the former consisting
of externally sourced information processing and the lat-
ter being internal state-control processes, as done here.
When one moves to higher levels of processing, sec-
ondary (learning), and tertiary processes (thought) lev-
els of analysis, cognitive and emotional issues do get
more conflated.
Another bias impeding progress is the fact that many
psychologists believe that emotions arise not from brain
evolution but from social-developmental learning based
on primal gradients (dimensions) of arousal and
valence.
13 This “experimental convenience”—namely a
convenient conceptual way to study human emotions
verbally—goes back to the 19th-century work of
Wilhelm Wundt, but it has never been firmly connected
to neuroscientific facts. Such dimensional approaches
effectively focus on the diverse languages of emotion (ie,
tertiary processes) with no compelling strategy for
unraveling primary-process emotional networks. To this
day, abundant “battles” are waged between psychologists
who espouse “basic emotion” views in human research
and those who prefer dimensional views. The “basic
emotion” approaches posit a variety of distinct, inher-
ited brain emotional systems; the “dimensional” views
envision distinct emotions simply to reflect verbal label-
ing of locations in some type of continuous affective
space that is defined by two continuous axes: generalized
forms of: (i) low and high arousal; and (ii) positive and
negative valence. 
The study of primary-process brain mechanisms of emo-
tions, best pursued in animal models, provides a bridge
that can help settle such debates. A primary-
process/basic emotion view may prevail in many sub-
cortical regions, and constructivist/dimensional
approaches may effectively parse higher emotional con-
cepts as processed by the neocortex (Table I). In other
words, such debates may simply reflect investigators
working at different levels of control.
The Affective Neuroscience
3 strategy relies on preclinical
evidence for the existence of a variety of primary-
process emotional networks in mammalian brains. These
networks are identified by distinct emotional behaviors
evoked with highly localized electrical stimulation of the
brain (ESB) sites which exist almost exclusively in sub-
cortical regions. Such instinct-generating sites also gen-
erate emotional feelings, as monitored by “reward” and
“punishment” attributes. In other words, animals care
whether such emotional states are evoked. The likeli-
hood that there are just singular types of “good” and
“bad” feelings (positive and negative valence) among
the subcortical affective networks is unlikely; humans
report a variety of emotional feelings that generally cor-
respond to the types of emotional actions evoked in ani-
mals.
14Also, a single primordial dimension of arousal
must be questioned: the psychological feeling of emo-
tional intensity is regulated by many systems—eg, acetyl-
choline, dopamine, glutamate, histamine, norepinephrine,
serotonin, and various neuropeptides—leaving open the
possibility of distinct types of arousal in lower regions of
the brain. Perhaps at a tertiary-process conceptual (neo-
cortical) level, we do conflate feelings into positive and
negative—“good” and “bad”—categories, but that is a
heuristic simplification (a Wittgensteinian “word game”)
promoted by our thinking processes. But can the neo-
cortex generate emotional feelings on its own?
Clinical research
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emotional systems has ever subscribed to the James-
Lange conjecture that affective feelings are only experi-
enced when unconscious sensory information about
bodily arousals reaches the neocortex. Beside Walter
Cannon’s seminal critique,
15 abundant modern findings
contradict that view: 
￿ The emotional-behavioral coherence of organisms is
fully formed in subneocortical regions of the brain—
eg, just consider that physical PLAY, the most complex
basic social emotion, persists after neodecortication.
16
￿ Both the emotional-behavioral and affective (reward
and punishment) aspects of ESB are most readily
obtained, with the lowest current levels, from the most
ancient midbrain regions (PAG or central gray) rather
than from higher emotional regions (eg, amygdala, cin-
gulate, and frontal cortices).
17
￿ Cognitive working-memory fields concentrated in dor-
solateral frontal cortical regions have a “seesaw” rela-
tionship with subcortical emotional-affective systems,
so that their activities are commonly reciprocally
related.
18
￿ Human brain imaging of intense emotional experi-
ences (anger, fear, sadness, and joy) “light up” subcor-
tical brain regions, homologous in all mammals.
19
The second point above is critical. There is a remarkable
correspondence between ESB sites yielding emotional
action patterns (the various distinct instinctual-behav-
ioral profiles, described below for each of seven primary
emotional processes) and their capacity to sustain “rein-
forced” learning in animals and intense emotional feel-
ings in humans. Accordingly, we can use a dual-aspect
monism strategy to study emotional feelings—ie, ESB
evoked RAGE behaviors reflect angry-type feelings
(animals turn off such ESB
20), while evoked PLAY
behaviors reflect joyful-type feelings—ESB evoking
play-vocalizations sustain self-stimulation reward,
21 etc.
(In physics, a related “dual-aspect” strategy—concurrent
acceptance of “wave” and “particle” descriptions of elec-
tromagnetic radiation—is needed to make sense of
available data). In the present view, the affective states
generated by primordial brain emotional networks may
have been among the first experiences that existed in
brain evolution. Without them, higher consciousness
(frontal neocortical executive functions) may not have
evolved.
22 In evolutionary terms, all primal emotional
systems are rooted in yet deeper and more ancient
processes. For example, the psychological pain of sepa-
ration-distress/GRIEF may have arisen from earlier
physical pain systems of the brain.
23
The primary-process emotional-affective 
networks of mammalian brains
Brain research supports the existence of at least seven
primary-process (basic) emotional systems—SEEKING,
RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, GRIEF (formerly
PANIC), and PLAY—concentrated in ancient subcorti-
cal regions of all mammalian brains. 
In sum, affective neuroscientific analysis of basic emo-
tions is based on several highly replicable facts: (i)
Coherent emotional-instinctual behaviors can be
aroused by electrically stimulating very specific subcor-
tical regions of the brain; (ii) Wherever one evokes emo-
tional action patterns with ESB, there are accompany-
ing affective experiences. Again, the gold standard for
this assertion is the fact that the brain stimulations can
serve as “rewards” when positive-emotions are
aroused—eg, SEEKING, LUST, CARE, and aspects of
PLAY. When negative emotions are aroused—RAGE,
FEAR, GRIEF—animals escape the stimulation; (iii)
The above behavioral and affective changes are rarely,
if ever, evoked from higher prefrontal neocortical
regions, suggesting that higher brain areas may not have
the appropriate circuitry to generate affective experi-
ences, although the neocortex can clearly regulate (eg,
inhibit) emotional arousals and, no doubt, prompt emo-
tional feelings by dwelling on life problems. 
The emotional primes are summarized in several mono-
graphs, with another appearing soon.
24 Thumbnail
descriptions are provided below, with one key reference
for each.
The SEEKING/desire system 
This extensive network confluent with the medial fore-
brain bundle (MFB) is traditionally called the “brain
reward system.” In fact, this is a general-purpose appet-
itive motivational system that is essential for animals to
acquire all resource needs for survival, and it probably
helps most other emotional systems to operate effec-
tively. It is a major source of life “energy”, sometimes
called “libido.” In pure form, it provokes intense and
enthusiastic exploration and appetitive anticipatory
excitement/learning. When fully aroused, SEEKING
25
fills the mind with interest and motivates organisms to
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desire. In humans, this system generates and sustains
curiosity from the mundane to our highest intellectual
pursuits. This system becomes underactive during addic-
tive drug withdrawal, chronic stress, and sickness, and
with accompanying feelings of depression. Overactivity
of this system can promote excessive and impulsive
behaviors, along with psychotic delusions and manic
thoughts. All antipsychotics reduce arousability of this
“reality-creating” mechanism of the brain. The term
“reality-creating” is used to highlight the fact that this
system appears to generate causal convictions about the
nature of the world from the perception of correlated
events (for a full discussion see Chapter 8 of Affective
Neuroscience
3). 
Neuroanatomically, SEEKING circuitry corresponds to
the extensive medial forebrain bundle and major
dopamine-driven, self-stimulation “reward” circuitry
coursing from ventral midbrain to nucleus accumbens
and medial frontal cortex, where it can promote frontal
cortical functions related to planning and foresight.
Rather than being a “pleasure or reinforcement system,”
SEEKING coaxes animals to acquire resources needed
for survival. It promotes learning by mediating antici-
patory eagerness, partly by coding predictive relation-
ships between events. It promotes a sense of engaged
purpose in both humans and animals, and is diminished
in depression and the dysphoria of withdrawal from
addictive drugs. This is further highlighted by the simple
fact that bilateral lesions of the system produce pro-
found amotivational states in animals (all appetitive
behaviors are diminished) and the elevated threshold for
self-stimulation reward probably reflects the dysphoria
state. 
The RAGE/anger system
When SEEKING is thwarted, RAGE
26 is aroused. Anger
is provoked by curtailing animals’ freedom of action.
RAGE is a reliably provoked ESB of a neural network
extending from the medial amygdala and hypothalamus
to the dorsal PAG. RAGE lies close to and interacts with
trans-diencephalic FEAR systems, highlighting the
implicit source of classic “fight-flight” terminology. It
invigorates aggressive behaviors when animals are irri-
tated or restrained, and also helps animals defend them-
selves by arousing FEAR in their opponents. Human
anger may get much of its psychic energy from the
arousal of this brain system; ESB of the above brain
regions can evoke sudden, intense anger attacks, with no
external provocation. Key chemistries which arouse this
system are the neuropeptide Substance P and glutamate,
while endogenous opioids and γ-aminobutyric acid
(GABA) inhibit the system. A prediction is that gluta-
mate and Substance P receptor antagonists (eg, aprepi-
tant) may help control human anger. Additional medi-
cines to control RAGE could presumably be developed




27 circuit helps to unconditionally
protect animals from pain and destruction. FEAR-ESB
leads animals to flee, whereas much weaker stimulation
elicits a freezing response. Humans stimulated in these
same brain regions report being engulfed by an intense
free-floating anxiety that appears to have no environ-
mental cause. Key chemistries that regulate this system
are Neuropeptide Y and corticotrophin releasing factor
(CRF); anti-anxiety agents such as the benzodiazepines
inhibit this system by facilitating GABA transmission.
The LUST/sexual systems
Sexual LUST,
28 mediated by specific brain circuits and
chemistries, distinct for males and females, is aroused by
male and female sex hormones, which control many brain
chemistries including two “social neuropeptides”—oxy-
tocin transmission is promoted by estrogen in females
and vasopressin transmission by testosterone in males.
These brain chemistries help create gender-specific sex-
ual tendencies. Oxytocin promotes sexual readiness in
females, as well as trust and confidence, and vasopressin
promotes assertiveness, and perhaps jealous behaviors, in
males. Distinct male and female sexual tendencies are
promoted by these steroid hormones early in life, with
sexual activation by gonadal hormones at puberty.
Because brain and bodily sex characteristics are inde-
pendently organized, it is possible for animals that are
externally male to have female-typical sexual urges and,
others with female external characteristics to have male-
typical sexual urges. The dopamine-driven SEEKING
system participates in the search for sexual rewards just
as for all other types of rewards, including those relevant
for the other social-emotional systems described below. 
Clinical research
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Brain evolution has provided safeguards to assure that
parents (usually the mother) take care of offspring.
Some of the chemistries of sexuality, for instance oxy-
tocin, have been evolutionarily redeployed to mediate
maternal care—nurturance and social bonding—sug-
gesting there is an intimate evolutionary relationship
between female sexual rewards and maternal motiva-
tions.
29 The shifting hormonal tides at the end of preg-
nancy (declining progesterone, and increasing estrogen,
prolactin, and oxytocin) invigorate maternal urges days
before the young are born. This collection of hormonal
and associated neurochemical changes also help assure
strong maternal bonds with offspring. 
The GRIEF/separation distress system
This system was initially called the PANIC system, but
few understood the intent of that primary-process ter-
minology, so we shifted to the more comprehensible ter-
tiary-process term of GRIEF
30 (highlighting once more
terminological problems in emotion research: what are
the differences between the tertiary-level emotions of
bereavement, grief, and mourning, for instance?). In any
event, young socially dependent animals have powerful
emotional systems to solicit nurturance. They exhibit
intense crying when lost, alerting caretakers to attend to
their offspring. ESB mapping of this separation-distress
system has highlighted circuitry running from dorsal
PAG to anterior cingulate, and it is aroused by glutamate
and CRF and inhibited by endogenous opioids, oxytocin,
and prolactin—the major social-attachment, social-
bonding chemistries of the mammalian brain. These neu-
rochemicals are foundational for the secure attachments
that are so essential for future mental health and happi-
ness. It is still worth considering that panic attacks may
reflect sudden endogenous spontaneous loss of feelings
of security (acute separation-distress) rather than sud-
den FEAR. We predict that these circuits are tonically
aroused during human grief and sadness, feelings that
accompany low brain opioid activity.
The PLAY/rough-and-tumble, physical social-
engagement system
Young animals have strong urges for physical play—run-
ning, chasing, pouncing, and wrestling. These “aggressive”-
assertive actions are consistently accompanied by positive
affect—an intense social joy—signaled in rats by making
abundant high frequency (~50 kHz) chirping sounds,
resembling laughter. One key function of social play is to
learn social rules and refine social interactions.
Subcortically concentrated PLAY
31 urges may promote the
epigenetic construction of higher social brain functions,
including empathy. Further studies of this system may lead
to the discovery of positive affect promoting neuro-
chemistries that may be useful in treating depression.
32
These seven emotional networks provide psychiatric
research with various endophenotypes important for
advancing psychiatric understanding of affective order
and disorder. For preclinical modeling, these emotional
systems provide a variety of affectively important
BrainMind networks to guide not only psychiatrically
relevant research, but as already highlighted, the devel-
opment of more specifically acting psychiatric medicines.
To highlight one concrete possibility, there will follow a
brief focus on how such systems may help us understand
the genesis and better treatment of depression. 
Emotional networks and depression
A key research question for affective disorders is why
depression feels so bad. Specifically, which negative
affect generating networks within mammalian brains
helps generate depressive pain that leads to chronic
despair? 
Although all the affective networks of the mammalian
brain can be influenced by depression—from diminished
CARE and PLAY to elevated FEAR and RAGE—the
“painfulness” of depressive affect may be engendered
most persistently (i) by sustained overactivity of GRIEF,
which promotes a downward cascade toward chronic
despair, following a theoretical view originally formu-
lated by John Bowlby.
33This promotes (ii) the sustained
dysphoria of depression which may be due largely to
abnormally low activity of the reward-SEEKING sys-
tem. For an extensive discussion, along with expert com-
mentaries, see ref 34. 
This vision allows investigators to focus on specific net-
work analyses as opposed to the nonspecific stress mod-
els most commonly employed. Many stressors are used
to evoke depressive phenotypes in animals—ranging
from physical restraint and various punishments to
intense psychological losses such as enforced maternal
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encounters.
35 Few models specifically modify or monitor
activities of specific emotional networks such as GRIEF
and SEEKING. Rather, they typically use very general
outcome measures—timidity during exploration (eg,
center crosses in open fields), various diminished plea-
sure responses (eg, diminished sexuality and consump-
tion of sweets) and varieties of learned helplessness (eg,
diminished struggling when placed into water). For
extensive summaries of such models, see the whole issue
of Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews devoted to this
topic (2006, vol 29).
As a result, existing research typically focuses on general
brain consequences of stress—from changing brain nor-
epinephrine and serotonin dynamics to many other brain
changes.
36 However, such general brain chemical changes
may not specifically clarify the morbid mood of depression.
The amines regulate rather general brain functions that
influence all emotions and related cognitive processes. We
now need strategies that aim to study the more specific
affective changes that characterize depression. This
requires a specific emotional network approach.
Primary-process emotional-systems analyses provide
preclinical models where specific types of affective
change can be manipulated and studied, and new treat-
ments can be developed based on the neurochemical
characteristics of the relevant circuits. For instance, the
separation-distress/GRIEF “protest” gateway to depres-
sion may engender “psychological pain” that can cascade
toward “despair” and sustained clinical depression.
30,34
The entry to despair may reflect diminished SEEKING
urges, promoting lack of initiative and lethargy, thereby
further amplifying dysphoria. Thus, primary-process
affective neuroscience is beginning to highlight distinct
emotional networks that may specifically help explain
why depression feels bad. This suggests potential bene-
fits of relatively safe mu-opioid agonists, such as the
mixed agonist-antagonists buprenorphine, and kappa
antagonists for treating depression (see below).
An affective neuroscientific perspective on
why depression feels so bad
As noted already, John Bowlby first emphasized that
depressive affects are related to the experiences of social
attachments and social loss. This is, epidemiologically,
now a well-supported conclusion.
37 Bowlby’s insight
about the crucial role of separation distress—the acute
“protest” or “panic” responses to social loss, especially
in young animals—allows neuroscience to clarify the
“painfulness” of social loss. The GRIEF system of sev-
eral species has been mapped to similar brain regions
(Figure 1), and this may be a key to the acute psycho-
logical pain of social loss. Indeed, the higher reaches of
this system in the anterior cingulate are targeted in
recent deep brain stimulation (DBS) initiatives for treat-
ment-resistant depressions.
38 A focus on the neuro-
chemical controls in this system provides other options
for medicinal development. Likewise, facilitation of
SEEKING urges should further facilitate recovery,
whether by joyful life activities, pharmacological stimu-
lation of SEEKING reserves, or even DBS of the
nucleus accumbens and MFB.
39
Opioids that activate mu receptors are especially effective
in reducing arousal of GRIEF/separation distress in ani-
mals.
42 Each of the above neurochemical controls (eg, opi-
oids and oxytocin) provides novel options to reduce the
psychic pain of depression in ways that are currently not
clinically used. Indeed, reasonably safe opioids, such as
ultra-low-dose buprenorphine, are very effective antide-
pressants for individuals who have obtained no relief from
standard antidepressants.
43 Similarly, drugs that inhibit
CRF and glutamate, the key neurochemistries that pro-
mote separation calls (vocalizations made when young ani-
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Figure 1. Human and animal sadness and animal separation-distress/GRIEF
systems. Animal data comes from mapping of separation dis-
tress circuits with localized electrical stimulation in guinea pigs
40
and human data from PET imaging of affective states by
Damasio’s group.
41 AC, anterior cingulate; VS, ventral striatum;
dPOA, dorsal preoptic area;  BN, bed nucleus of the stria ter-
minalis;  DMT, dorsomedial thalamus; PAG, periaqueductal gray
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mals are separated from mothers or siblings, ie, GRIEF),
have yielded promising antidepressant effects.
44,45
In sum, GRIEF circuitry evolved from general pain
mechanisms, well over a hundred million years ago
(birds possess a homologous system). This emotional sys-
tem forges social bonds and dependencies between
infants and caretakers, and probably regulates adult
social relationships and solidarity. The affective conse-
quences of severed attachment bonds make adults suf-
fer in a distinct way, commonly called grief, but this is not
yet clinical depression. 
Separation distress is only 
the gateway to depression
The acute GRIEF response may need to be supple-
mented by other neuroaffective changes before individ-
uals cascade into sustained depressive lassitude and
despair. Cytokines that promote sickness feelings (eg,
Interleukin 1) and endogenous inflammatory cascades
have been proposed as possible causal vectors; both may
operate, in part, by diminishing SEEKING arousals.
46A
sustained depressive phenotype may arise when dimin-
ished SEEKING urges allow the behavioral manifesta-
tions of GRIEF (the “protest” phase of separation dis-
tress) to diminish. This need not mean that the
intrapsychic pain of GRIEF also disappears. Indeed, if
the psychic pain is sustained, the dysphoria of dimin-
ished SEEKING could further elevate negative affect.
Thus, depressive affect may start with psychological pain
(GRIEF, with concurrent SEEKING arousal) followed
by “giving up” (consisting of sustained psychic pain,
accompanied by the lethargic anhedonia of diminished
SEEKING). 
Diminished brain reward in preclinical models of
depressive states is well established,
47 but it is not yet
clear how this happens. A promising candidate is ele-
vated dynorphin activity along SEEKING circuitry.
Indeed, dynorphin mediates the negative affect arising
from loss in competitive social encounters.
48 Again, this
suggest that severe depression may be optimally coun-
teracted by medicines that reduce both social-loss
induced psychic pain and depleted SEEKING resources;
low-dose buprenorphine can counteract both through its
mu-opioid agonist and kappa-receptor antagonism
effects. Addictive tendencies are markedly reduced since
higher doses block mu receptors which blunt opioid tol-
erance and escalating addictive dosing. 
Thus, although negative affective changes in the opioid-
and oxytocin-driven attachment and affectional systems
may be the pivotal precipitants of psychological pain that
is the entry point for a depressive cascade, it may be
diminished SEEKING that pushes the system into a sus-
tained clinically significant dysphoria. This scenario does
not exclude the potential contribution of other biogenic
amine imbalances in depression—changes in overall
brain arousal can reinforce the above affective changes.
Because of the affective complexity and diversity of
depression, many variants on these basic themes can be
envisioned, yielding many subtypes of depression. It
would be premature to try to relate the emotional primes
to the various subtypes—anxious, agitated, etc—but to
simply indicate that FEAR overactivity may contribute
to anxious forms, while the GRIEF separation-distress
system might contribute more to melancholic forms,
while selectively diminished SEEKING may contribute
to those forms where agitation is not prevalent. 
The critical point is that detailed clarification of dedi-
cated emotional-affective circuits in mammalian brain
should allow us eventually to invest in more direct affec-
tive strategies to understand and treat depression as well
as other psychiatric disorders accompanied by imbal-
anced affective states.
10 This may be a substantial
advance over generalized stress models, for it is easier to
envision how to focus on changes in specific brain emo-
tional circuits rather than more global stress-induced
brain changes. Affective circuit perspectives also coax us
to consider the potential benefits of strengthening vari-
ous positive emotional systems to promote affective
homeostasis. For instance, therapeutic approaches that
promote the positive hedonics of social CARE and
PLAY systems may increase treatment options that
could yield better outcomes than existing therapies.
To develop this last theme a little further, when we develop
antidepressants that can rapidly and specifically promote
desired affective rebalancing, we might consider develop-
ing complementary psychotherapeutic approaches where
clinicians explicitly seek to utilize the power of positive
affective systems of clients’ brains. For instance, the “power
of PLAY” in adult psychotherapy remains largely unused,
although preclinical benefits for childhood problems such
as excessive impulsivity have been documented.
49
Considering that PLAY can promote the expression of
various neurotrophins like brain-derived neurotrophic fac-
tor,
50 and insulin-like growth factor 1,
32 it is to be expected
that playful interactions, just like exercise, may have anti-
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reinforce better and longer-lasting psychotherapeutic ben-
efits. Affective neuroscientific thinking suggests many
other new avenues for medicinal developments since all
primary-process emotional systems seem to have unique
neuropeptidergic controls.
51
Summary: the promise of 
new therapeutic approaches
In the above context, it would not only be of interest to
explore novel psychotherapeutic approaches that might
specifically influence endogenous neurochemical controls
of the other affective networks of mammalian brains, but
clinicians may seek to estimate the primary-process emo-
tional strengths and weaknesses of clients so as to better
envision the major emotional forces that may have
become imbalanced in major forms of emotional distress.
Of course, primary processes in humans can only be esti-
mated through tertiary-process verbal reports. Although
there are shortcomings in such approaches, we have
developed the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales
to provide a tool whereby clinicians may better estimate
the primary-process emotional traits in normal as well as
psychiatric patients.
52
A better understanding of the emotional endophenotypes
discussed here may help guide clinicians to deal more
strategically with the raw and troublesome feelings of their
clients, and give them clearer explanations of the sources
of their distress. This may be beneficial for many patients.
The approach also provides new avenues, yet to be devel-
oped, that better recruit the personal affective resources
of clients to promote healing. Therapists who can work
effectively with the basic emotions—reframing and recon-
textualizing hurtful memories so they can be reconsoli-
dated in the context of positive feelings—may be able to
promote more lasting therapeutic change than those that
seek to remain more strictly at cognitive levels of inter-
action. This is not to minimize the ability of cognitive
processes to reframe stressful life events and to regulate
negative emotionality through the analysis of life options,
but to suggest that more direct work with the nature of
affects is a perspective that remains underdeveloped. 
In conclusion, affective neuroscience also has implications
for the future development of animal models of psychiatric
disorders. Currently preclinical models are rather deficient,
as highlighted by Steven Hyman (see above).
11What has
been lacking so far is a more direct focus on manipulating
specific emotional processes to simulate psychiatric disor-
ders and to also have outcome measures that are not so
general (eg, gross locomotor activity, swimming, and other
stress-provoked changes that cannot be easily linked to
specific brain affective circuits). By using an affective neu-
roscience approach, we can now monitor affective states
by the ethological-emotional patterns of animals, especially
diverse emotional vocalizations that can be used as direct
“self-reports” of changes in affective states.
53,54Also, even
though preclinical models can tell us a great deal about
brain emotional and stress-induced changes that cannot
be harvested in other ways, we must recognize that such
approaches cannot penetrate the tertiary-process cogni-
tive complexities that make human emotional life so rich
and full of conflicts and devilishly complex vicissitudes.
However, what a cross-species affective neuroscience strat-
egy does provide is a better and more precise focus on the
diverse forms of affective distress and euphoria that can
arise from the basic emotional circuits of all mammalian
brains, leading to concrete hypotheses of how each system
may contribute to higher mental processes. For such a dis-
cussion of RAGE circuitry, see ref 55 and the relations of
GRIEF and SEEKING systems for further understand-
ing of addictions,
54,56,57 and depression.
34,58-60 Such issues are
central for many psychiatric concerns.
A final issue that deserves attention is how such view-
points may relate to psychiatric disorder susceptibility
issues. One general principle might be that better evalu-
ation of basic emotional personality traits may provide
a tool for analyzing such relationships.
52 Although it is
premature to reach any conclusions, we hypothesize that
heightened constitutional sensitivity of GRIEF systems
and endogenous underactivity of SEEKING urges
would facilitate the emergence of depression in response
to stressors. To evaluate this, we have generated genetic
lines of animals that exhibit high and low positive affect
based on heritability of emotional vocalizations.
61
Preliminary work suggests that the high positive affect
animals may be resistant to depression while low ones
may be more susceptible to depression.
62 Related work
has been pursued at the genetic level by others.
63
Once we have a clear scientific understanding of the pri-
mary emotional processes of mammalian brains, we may
be able to employ the concept of endophenotypes more
effectively than it is currently used.
10 Such foundational
knowledge may serve as a useful roadmap for gathering
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Neurociencias afectivas del cerebro 
emocional: perspectivas evolutivas 
y sus consecuencias para comprender 
la depresión
Los estudios de las neurociencias afectivas a través
de las especies confirman que los sentimientos emo-
cionales como proceso primario están organizados
dentro de las regiones subcorticales primitivas del
cerebro, las que son anatómica, neuroquímica y
funcionalmente homólogas en todos los mamíferos
que se han estudiado. Los sentimientos emociona-
les (afectos) son valores intrínsecos que informan a
los animales acerca de cómo se están manejando en
la búsqueda de la sobrevivencia. Los diversos afec-
tos positivos indican que los animales están retor-
nando a las “zonas de confort” que permiten la
sobrevivencia y los afectos negativos reflejan las
“zonas de disconfort” que indican que los animales
están en situaciones en que se puede deteriorar la
sobrevivencia. Ellos constituyen herramientas ances-
trales para vivir, memorias evolutivas de tal impor-
tancia que fueron codificadas en el genoma de
forma primitiva (como proceso cerebral primario),
que han sido refinadas mediante mecanismos de
aprendizaje básico (procesos secundarios), como
por cogniciones/pensamientos de orden más ele-
vado (procesos terciarios). Para comprender el por-
qué de los horribles sentimientos depresivos se
debe profundizar en la infraestructura afectiva del
cerebro de los mamíferos. Los avances en nuestra
comprensión acerca de la naturaleza de los afectos
emocionales como proceso primario puede favore-
cer el desarrollo de mejores modelos preclínicos de
los trastornos psiquiátricos y por consiguiente tam-
bién permitir a los clínicos nuevas y útiles vías para
comprender los aspectos básicos de los problemas
de sus clientes. Estas redes son de gran importancia
para la comprensión de los trastornos psiquiátricos
y el avance en la práctica psiquiátrica.      
Neuroscience affective du cerveau 
émotionnel : perspectives évolutionistes 
et implications dans la compréhension 
de la dépression
Des études de neuroscience affective entre espèces
confirment que les principales émotions s’organi-
sent dans les régions sous-corticales primitives du
cerveau qui sont anatomiquement, neurochimi-
quement et fonctionnellement homologues chez
tous les mammifères étudiés. Les émotions (affects)
sont des données intrinsèques qui informent les ani-
maux sur leurs possibilités de réussite de survie. Les
différents affects positifs montrent que les animaux
retournent vers les « zones de confort » qui per-
mettent la survie et les affects négatifs témoignent
des « zones d’inconfort » qui indiquent que les ani-
maux sont dans des situations qui peuvent mena-
cer leur survie. Ce sont des outils de subsistance
ancestraux, souvenirs de l’évolution d’une telle
importance qu’ils ont été codés dans le génome
sous une forme approximative (comme les proces-
sus primaires du cerveau), qui sont affinés par des
apprentissages basiques (processus secondaires)
ainsi que par des connaissances/pensées d’un ordre
supérieur (processus tertiaire). Pour comprendre
l’horreur de la dépression, nous devons appréhen-
der l’infrastructure affective du cerveau des mam-
mifères. Des progrès dans notre compréhension de
la nature des processus primaires des affects émo-
tionnels peuvent favoriser le développement de
modèles précliniques de troubles psychiatriques
plus performants et donc aussi offrir aux médecins
des voies nouvelles et utiles pour comprendre les
aspects fondamentaux des problèmes de leurs
patients. Ces réseaux sont très importants pour
comprendre les troubles psychiatriques et progres-
ser en psychiatrie.
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